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With this issue, we complete the 1979 Montana Supreme
Court Survey by offering the remaining segments on Civil Proce-
dure, Evidence, and Criminal Procedure. Because of the thorough
analysis of these survey articles, our hope is that topics dealt with
exhaustively here need not be reviewed in future surveys for at
least two years. In that way, future surveys may consider specific
topics within the area of Civil Procedure, Evidence, and Criminal
Procedure with the care which would not be possible were the en-
tire field to be covered each year.
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INTRODUCTION
Montana decisions from October 1, 1978, to December 31,
1979, reflect the supreme court's tendency to interpret the Mon-
tana Rules of Civil Procedure and Rules of Evidence in accordance
with federal authority under the corresponding federal rules. Al-
though most decisions follow well-settled principles, there were a
few major developments. The authors have selected those cases
which indicate new trends or which otherwise are of practical im-
portance to Montana attorneys.* Some of the topics discussed in
this survey are in a state of flux. Therefore, Montana attorneys
should be alert for changes that may have occurred since Decem-
ber 31, 1979.
I. CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. Relation Back of Amendments: Rule 15(c)
In two recent decisions, the Montana Supreme Court clarified
the doctrine of relation back of amendments under Montana Rule
of Civil Procedure 15(c)" where a party seeks to amend a complaint
to bring a defendant into a lawsuit after the statute of limitations
has run. In both LaForest v. Texaco, Inc.' and Vincent v. Ed-
* The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Professor William F. Crowley of
the University of Montana School of Law faculty. While Professor Crowley provided valua-
ble background comments and suggestions, the authors are responsible for the opinions and
analyses expressed in this survey.
1. Montana Rule 15(c), which is identical to the federal rule, states in part:
(c) Relation Back of Amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted
in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set
forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates
back to the date of the original pleading. An amendment changing the party
against whom a claim is asserted relates back if the foregoing provision is satisfied
and, within the period provided by law for commencing the action against him,
the party to be brought in by amendment (1) has received such notice of institu-
tion of the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the
merits, and (2) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the
identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against him.
2. - Mont. -- , 585 P.2d 1318 (1978).
294 [Vol. 41
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wardss the court held that Rule 15(c) will not save a claim from
the statute of limitations unless the party sought to be added had
notice of the original lawsuit.
In LaForest, the plaintiff instituted his action against the
wrong parties. After the statute of limitations had run, he filed an
amended complaint to substitute the correct party as defendant."
The court considered the language of Rule 15(c), which states that
a party sought to be added must have had notice "of [the] institu-
tion of the action" before the amendment will relate back to the
date of filing of the original complaint. Relying upon a ninth cir-
cuit case,5 the court decided that "action" means "lawsuit." There-
fore, it was not sufficient that the party sought to be made defen-
dant had notice of the incident giving rise to the suit, unless he
also had notice of the lawsuit itself.'
In Vincent, the plaintiff did not know the names of some of
the defendants when she filed the lawsuit.7 She designated them
by fictitious names pursuant to Montana Code Annotated [herein-
after cited as MCA] § 25-5-103 (1979)." The court found that Rule
15(c) governed amendment of complaints under the fictitious name
statute.' Since the persons sought to be joined did not have notice
of the action as required by Rule 15(c), they could not be joined as
defendants after the statute of limitations had run.10
LaForest and Vincent are consistent with the language and
purpose of Rule 15(c), which is designed to prevent an unjust re-
sult where the "newly named defendant received notice of the ac-
tion and knew or should have known that he was the intended de-
fendant."' A party unaware of the filing of a lawsuit should be
3. - Mont., 601 P.2d 1184 (1979).
4. La Forest, - Mont. -, 585 P.2d at 1319.
5. The court cited Craig v. United States, 413 F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1969). Id. at -, 585
P.2d at 1321.
6. In Craig v. United States, 413 F.2d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 1969), it was stated:
"[Aiction," as used in Rule 15(c), means a lawsuit, and not the incident giving rise
to a lawsuit. The relevant words are "notice of the institution of the action." A
lawsuit is instituted; an incident is not.
Federal cases addressing the issue are collected at Annot., 11 A.L.R. Fed. 269, 279 § 4
(1972).
7. Vincent, - Mont. -, 601 P.2d at 1186.
8. The fictitious name statute provides:
When the plaintiff is ignorant of the name of the defendant, such defendant may
be designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name; and when his true name
is discovered, the pleadings or proceedings may be amended accordingly.
9. Vincent, __ Mont. -, 601 P.2d at 1187.
10. Id. at -, 601 P.2d at 1188, 1190.
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accorded the protection of the statute of limitations.
B. Joinder of Indispensable Parties: Rule 19
Montana's rule on joinder of indispensable parties1 2 is being
brought into line with federal authority. In Preste v. Mountain
Ranches, Inc., the Montana court held that where an agent and
principal engage in a wrongful act, both are not necessarily indis-
pensable parties to an action arising out of the act."3 In Preste, the
alleged principal sued the defendant for breach of contract. 14 The
court followed federal case law in holding that the alleged agent
was not necessarily an indispensable party.15 This holding furthers
the purpose of Montana Rule of Civil Procedure 19, which abol-
ishes reliance on abstract categorizations of interest.' 6 Under the
rule, pragmatic considerations dictate which parties are so essen-
tial as to preclude continuing the action in their absence.1
7
12. MONT. R. Crv. P. 19 provides in part:
Rule 19. Joinder of persons needed for just adjudication. (a) Persons to Be
Joined If Feasible. A person who is subject to service of process shall be joined as
a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded
among those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of
the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may
(i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii)
leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring
double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed
interest. If he has not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a
party. If he should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may be made a
defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects
to venue and his joinder would render the venue of the action improper, he shall
be dismissed from the action.
(b) Determination by Court of Whenever Joinder Not Feasible. If a person
as described in subdivision (a)(1)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court
shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed
among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being thus
regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court include: first,
to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial
to him or those already parties; second, the extent to which, by protective provi-
sions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice
can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's
absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate rem-
edy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
13. - Mont. -, 590 P.2d 1132, 1136 (1979).
14. Id. at -, 590 P.2d at 1134.
15. Id. at -, 590 P.2d at 1136.
16. Montana Rule 19 is based on the federal rule. The Advisory Committee's Notes to
FED. R. Civ. P. 19, 28 U.S.C.A. Rules 17 to 23.2 at 106 explains, "The subdivision (a) defini-
tion of persons to be joined is not couched in terms of the abstract nature of their inter-
ests-'joint,' 'united,' 'separable,' or the like."
17. The Advisory Committee's Note to the September 29, 1967, Amendment of MONT.
R. Civ. P. 19, states:
The changes are intended to make clear that whenever feasible the persons mate-
4
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Preste recognized that the mere categorization of the parties
as principal and agent is not conclusive, but did not discuss the
pragmatic aspects of the case to see whether Rule 19 required join-
der. As a result, the case is of little value in determining how the
court will apply Rule 19 standards.18 The decision does indicate,
however, that counsel seeking to rely on the rule must be prepared
to prove more than some abstract legal relationship between a
party to the suit and the person sought to be joined.
C. Jury Selection
1. Inquiry into Insurance on Voir Dire
The strict taboo against mention of insurance in personal in-
jury actions may be giving way in Montana. In Borkoski v. Yost,19
the court reversed a stance it has maintained for fifty years by
adopting the majority American view that certain insurance mat-
ters can be inquired into on voir dire.
In Borkoski, the plaintiff unsuccessfully sought to inquire into
prospective jurors' exposure to insurance company advertisements
stating that large jury awards increase insurance premiums.20 The
Montana Supreme Court held that such questioning should be al-
lowed, but only after a strict foundation requirement is met.2 1 The
court also held that counsel can ask prospective jurors whether
they are stockholders or employees of insurance companies.2 If the
rially interested in the subject of an action should be joined as parties so that they
may be heard and a complete disposition made. When this comprehensive joinder
cannot be accomplished the case should be examined pragmatically and a choice
made between the alternatives of proceeding with the action in the absence of
particular interested persons, and dismissing the action.
18. In Preste, the court relied on Wheat v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 146 Mont. 105, 404
P.2d 317 (1965), which was decided before Rule 19 was materially altered in 1967. Preste,
- Mont. -, 590 P.2d at 1136. A more useful analysis of Rule 19 appears in State ex rel.
Drum v. District Court, 169 Mont. 494, 548 P.2d 1377 (1976).
19. - Mont. -, 594 P.2d 688 (1979).
20. Id. at -, 594 P.2d at 689-90.
21. Id. at -, 594 P.2d at 694-95. The attorney should first present to the court evi-
dence of recent mass advertising designed to bias jurors against large damage awards. Next,
the attorney must ask whether the prospective juror (1) has heard or read any matter which
might affect his impartiality or (2) regularly reads any of the publications in which it has
been demonstrated the insurance advertisements or articles have appeared. Questioning can
continue only if a positive response is received to one of these inquiries. Counsel may then
inquire whether the prospective juror has heard or read anything indicating that jury ver-
dicts increase insurance premiums; if so, whether he believes the materials, and whether
such belief will interfere with the juror's impartiality. Inquiries into any insurance matter
during voir dire are subject to a showing that counsel is acting in good faith and is not
merely attempting to inform the jury that the defendant has insurance coverage.
22. Id. at -, 594 P.2d at 692, 694.
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insurance company involved is a named party or is a mutual com-
pany in which policyholders' premiums are determined directly by
the amount of damages paid, counsel can ascertain whether the
prospective jurors are policyholders in the company.
2 3
Despite its holding, the Montana court did not reverse because
it found that Borkoski had not been prejudiced by his inability to
inquire into the advertisements. The court assumed that the ad-
vertising discussed only damages, and not liability. The court rea-
soned that Borkoski could not have been prejudiced because the
jury found the defendants not liable and consequently did not
reach the question of damages. The court stated, "At no point is it
suggested, either by Borkoski or in the advertisements themselves,
that juries should not find a party negligent in the first place." 2'
In making this declaration, the court overlooked an advertise-
ment described at length in the opinion 25 and reprinted in an arti-
cle cited by the court.2 6 The advertisement, sponsored by Aetna
Life and Casualty, states: "We can stop assessing 'liability' where
there really was no fault-and express our sympathy for the vic-
tims through other means." In addition, it could be argued that a
juror who has decided to reduce his insurance premiums by reduc-
ing damages can do so most effectively by finding no liability.
Borkoski is the culmination of a puzzling series of cases that
began in 1910 with Beeler v. Butte & London Copper Develop-
ment Co.17 In Beeler, the court stated that an inquiry as to
whether prospective jurors had a business relationship with the de-
fendant's insurer was a proper aid to the plaintiff in making his
peremptory challenges.2 8 However, seventeen years later the court
held that Beeler would apply only when the opposing party failed
to object to the first inquiry into insurance.2 9 As late as 1967 the
23. Id.
24. Id. at -, 594 P.2d at 695.
25. Id. at -, 594 P.2d at 689.
26. The advertisement is reprinted in Insurance Company Ads Draw Fire, 64 A.B.A.J.
531 (1978), cited in Borkoski, - Mont. -, 594 P.2d at 690.
27. 41 Mont. 465, 110 P. 528 (1910).
28. Apparently respondents deemed this information necessary as an aid to the
intelligent exercise of their peremptory challenges. It does not appear that either
the purpose or tendency of these questions was to inform the jury that the burden
of a judgment, if obtained, would fall on an insurance company instead of the
defendant, and the company was not afterwards mentioned in the case. The first
time the question was asked, no objection whatever was made, and we are unable
to see how the appellant could have been prejudiced by the examination.
Id. at 473, 110 P. at 530.
29. Robinson v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 80 Mont. .431, 443, 261 P. 253, 257 (1927), rev'd
on other grounds, Hayward v. Richardson Construction Co., 136 Mont. 241, 347 P.2d 475
(1959); Thomas v. Whiteside, 148 Mont. 394, 421 P.2d 449 (1966). The court in Robinson
298 [Vol. 41
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court adhered firmly to the rule prohibiting inquiry into insurance.
In Avery v. City of Anaconda, the court. stated: "The law is well-
settled in this state that the action of the lower court in permitting
this type of questioning on voir dire was prejudicial and reversible
error."
so
The court backed away from this rule in 1973 in Haynes v.
County of Missoula.3 1 In Haynes, the court noted that the major-
ity rule in the United States allowed the questioning of prospective
jurors about their connection with liability insurance companies.
32
The court did not adopt the majority rule, however, choosing in-
stead to distinguish the case from prior decisions on the ground
that the insurance company was a named party in Haynes."
But in Borkoski, the court decided that Haynes had "in effect
reversed" former case law.' Although Borkoski raised only the is-
sue of prejudicial advertising, the court also discussed permissible
inquiries into jurors' business connections with insurance compa-
nies, and jurors' memberships in mutual insurance companies that
are involved in the case or named as parties. 5 The court's discus-
sion of these principles appears to be dictum; nevertheless, the
court stated that the rules were included in the holding of the
case."
It is unclear whether Borkoski has any significance aside from
voir dire. Montana has long held that the mention of insurance
during a personal injury trial requires the severe sanction of grant-
ing a mistrial.3 7 Although some exceptions exist to the automatic
stated that if an objection were properly raised on the first inquiry into insurance, the trial
court would commit reversible error by allowing a party to ask about prospective jurors'
business connections with insurance companies.
30. 149 Mont. 495, 497, 428 P.2d 465, 466 (1967).
31. 163 Mont. 270, 517 P.2d 370 (1973).
32. Id. at 287-88, 517 P.2d at 380.
33. [The majority rule becomes] compelling in a case where an insurance com-
pany is a named party to the litigation. Montana, inferentially at least, observes
the distinction with respect to voir dire examination of prospective jurors in cases
involving an insurance company as a party and those cases in which it is not.
(Prior case law is] distinguishable on this basis and accordingly inapplicable to the
instant case.
Id. at 288, 517 P.2d at 380.
34. Borkoski, - Mont. -, 594 P.2d at 691-92.
35. Id. at -, 594 P.2d at 692.
36. Therefore, we hold that in appropriate cases an attorney upon voir dire may
inquire of prospective jurors whether they have any business relationship with in-
surance companies and whether they are policyholders of an insurance company
named as a defendant or of a mutual insurance company involved in the case.
Id. at -, 594 P.2d at 694.
37. "Ordinarily injection of the fact that defendant is protected by liability insurance
into such a case, directly or indirectly, by evidence, arguments, or remarks constitutes re-
19801
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mistrial rule,"8 the court's adherence to the sanction generally has
been firm."9 It remains to be seen whether Borkoski signals a weak-
ening of the automatic mistrial rule or is merely a warning to in-
surance companies to abstain from prejudicial advertising.
2. Peremptory Challenges: Rule 47(b)
A common question faced by district courts is how many per-
emptory challenges should be allowed to multiple defendants dur-
ing jury selection in civil cases. Montana's jury selection statute
states that "each party is entitled to four peremptory chal-
lenges ... 2 "0 Recognizing the potential unfairness of uneven per-
emptory challenges, the Montana Supreme Court has construed
"each party" to mean "each side" when multiple defendants are
involved, unless the interests of the multiple defendants are hostile
to each other." The Montana Rules of Civil Procedure likewise re-
fer to "each side" in discussing peremptories, and allow for addi-
tional peremptories when circumstances warrant it. 4" Determining
whether hostility exists is crucial to answering the question of how
many peremptory challenges should be allowed to multiple
defendants.
The Montana Supreme Court recently addressed this problem
in Hunsaker v. Bozeman Deaconess Foundation."s In Hunsaker,
the district court consolidated three related cases over the objec-
tion of the plaintiff." The district court also allowed, without an
versible error." D'Hooge v. McCann, 151 Mont. 353, 359-60, 443 P.2d 747, 750 (1968).
38. MONT. R. EVID. 411 states that evidence of liability insurance is inadmissible to
prove liability, but admissible to show agency, ownership, control, bias, or prejudice of a
witness. See also Meinecke v. Intermountain Transp. Co., 101 Mont. 315, 323-24, 55 P.2d
680, 682 (1936), where the court held reversal was not warranted when a witness unexpect-
edly disclosed that the defendant carried liability insurance; the court emphasized that
damages were not excessive.
39. D'Hooge v. McCann, 151 Mont. 353, 359-60, 443 P.2d 747, 750 (1968).
40. MONTANA CODE ANNOTATED [hereinafter cited as MCA] § 25-7-224 (1979) (empha-
sis added).
41. See, e.g., Mullery v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 50 Mont. 408, 416-17, 148 P. 323,
325-26 (1915). Montana is apparently among the majority of jurisdictions that have consid-
ered the question. See Annot., 32 A.L.R.3d 747, 752 (1970).
42. MONT. R. Civ. P. 47(b) provides: "[e ach side shall have four peremptory chal-
lenges . . . . In the event there is more than one party defendant, and should it appear
that each defendant is entitled to peremptory challenges, then the original panel shall be
increased to provide four additional jurors for each defendant. . .entitled to exercise per-
emptory challenges." (emphasis added).
43. - Mont. -, 588 P.2d 493 (1978).
44. The three actions were the deceased Hunsaker's estate against the hospital for
negligent care, the deceased's estate against his doctors for failure to diagnose his condition,
and Hunsaker's widow's derivative action against the hospital for negligence. - Mont. -,
588 P.2d at 497. The general rule that peremptory challenges are to be exercised collectively
8
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express finding of hostility, four peremptory challenges to each de-
fendant.4 5 On appeal, the supreme court discussed at great length
the inherent difficulty of reviewing the district court's ruling, since
the record did not set out its reasons for granting the motion.4e
Concluding that "discretion exercised under these circumstances is
no discretion at all," the court imposed an obligation on trial coun-
sel and district courts to make proper records and offered the fol-
lowing suggestions:
1. Existing procedural rules, particularly pretrial conferences,
are ideally suited for resolution of the number of peremptories to
be allowed.
47
2. If there is no pretrial conference, the issue should be raised
by motion, setting forth facts and law.
3. The district court should set forth its reasons and the facts on
which it relies in making its ruling.
48
Hunsaker also raises two related questions that the court does
not completely resolve. The first is what constitutes "hostility" of
interest, warranting peremptory challenges by each defendant. The
court stated in Hunsaker that no rules had previously been set
forth on this question, other than to say it can be shown by plead-
ings, representations, or evidence." This statement ignores
Kudrna v. Comet Corp., where the hostility requirement was dis-
cussed in some detail. 0 In Kudrna, hostility was found by examin-
ing the plaintiff's theory of recovery from each defendant, the de-
fendant's separate defenses, and the fact that the defendants tried
to place responsibility on one another.'1 In Hunsaker the court ex-
amined the same factors and found no hostility since the defen-
dant's theories reinforced one another and the defendants synchro-
nized their jury instructions.2 A more precise definition of
hostility awaits further development, as cases with adequate find-
applies when several parties are united by consolidation as well as when they are joined on
one complaint, at least if the formally united parties are not regarded as having diverse
interests. Annot., 32 A.L.R.3d 747, 772 (1970). The rule in federal courts is different. See
note 18 & accompanying text infra.
45. - Mont. -, 588 P.2d at 500.
46. Id. at -, 588 P.2d at 499-501.
47. MoNT. R. Civ. P. 16 gives district courts broad discretion to hold a pretrial confer-
ence to resolve a wide variety of questions in an effort to streamline the trial process.
48. Id. at -, 588 P.2d at 501.
49. Hunsaker, - Mont. -, 588 P.2d at 499, citing Mullery, 50 Mont. at 416-17, 148
P. at 325-26 and Leary v. Kelly Pipe Co., 169 Mont. 511, 515, 549 P.2d 813, 816 (1976).
50. - Mont..__, 572 P.2d 183, 186-87 (1977).
51. Id.
52. Hunsaker, - Mont. -, 588 P.2d at 500. The court noted that the defendants'
theories "meshed like the finest gearshift mechanism."
1980]
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ings of fact and law are presenteed to the supreme court for
review.
The second problem raised by Hunsaker is whether a plaintiff
must demonstrate on appeal that he was prejudiced by the allow-
ance of excessive peremptory challenges to the defendants. Al-
though the court has wavered on this question, the rule in Mon-
tana is that prejudice must be shown. 3 The court in Hunsaker
noted that proving prejudice is virtually impossible, since the
plaintiff would have to show that a biased juror sat on the case."
The court seemed dissatisfied with imposing such a heavy burden
on the plaintiff.5 5 It remains to be seen whether the court's uneasi-
ness will result in reversal when review of an adquate record indi-
cates an incorrect allowance of excessive peremptories.
The federal rules relating to peremptory challenges are similar
to Montana rules. The federal statute dealing with peremptory
challenges provides:
In civil cases, each party shall be entitled to three peremptory
challenges. Several defendants or several plaintiffs may be consid-
ered as a single party for the purpose of making challenges. Or
the court may allow additional peremptory challenges and permit
them to be exercised separately or jointly."'
The statute allows flexibility in the matter of challenges but
does not apply to consolidated actions. In consolidated cases each
defendant is allowed three peremptories, and a single defendant
against multiple plaintiffs gets the same number of peremptories
as all of the plaintiffs combined. With respect to consolidated
cases, federal practice differs from the rules followed in state
courts."8
Hunsaker should warn Montana lawyers to establish an ade-
53. Leary v. Kelly Pipe Co., 169 Mont. 511, 516, 549 P.2d 813, 816 (1976). The court
stated in dictum in Ferron v. Intermountain Trans. Co., 115 Mont. 388, 392, 143 P.2d 893,
895 (1943) that to allow excessive peremptories is reversible error as a matter of law
(prejudice is presumed). Leary expressly overruled Ferron on this point, however. 169 Mont.
at 516, 549 P.2d at 816.
54. See Leary, 169 Mont. at 516, 549 P.2d at 816-17; Ashley v. Safeway Stores, 100
Mont. 312, 322-23, 47 P.2d 53, 58 (1935).
55. See Hunsaker, - Mont. -, 588 P.2d at 501 where the court said that it can't
really guess as to actual prejudice, but cannot blind itself to the advantage to one side of
having additional peremptories. This is precisely why review of the correctness of the trial
court's decision must be part of the review on appeal.
56. 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1976).
57. 5A MoorE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 47.07, at 2029 (2d ed. 1979) citing Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Hillman, 145 U.S. 285 (1892) and Signal Mountain and Portland Cement Co. v.
Brown, 141 F.2d 471 (6th Cir. 1944).
58. See note 44 supra.
[Vol. 41
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quate factual and legal record in the trial court to justify addi-
tional peremptory challenges, or risk reversal on appeal. As more
complete records are presented for review, the supreme court will
develop a more precise definition of hostility. Until then, counsel
should be prepared to separate theories of recovery and defense
from those of other litigants to establish their adverse interests.
Hunsaker may also signal the court's willingness to abandon the
rule requiring a party to prove he was prejudiced by the allowance
of excess peremptories.
D. Summary Judgment: Rule 56
Rule 56 of the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure provides a
method for prompt disposal of cases presenting no genuine issue of
material fact. The purpose of summary judgment is to eliminate
unnecessary trials, delay, and expense. 59 The rule requires a court
to grant summary judgment if the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits in the record show
that no material factual issue exists, and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 0 The Montana Supreme
Court has discussed this situation frequently, but only recently has
the court considered whether summary judgment may be granted
in favor of a non-moving party.e'
In Hereford v. Hereford the supreme court ruled that sum-
mary judgment may properly be granted to a non-moving party
where the moving party has been afforded a fair opportunity to
meet the proposition that there is no genuine factual issue."
Before granting summary judgment to a non-moving party, the
moving party must be given notice and reasonable opportunity to
be heard on issues not raised by his own motion. In so holding,
the Montana court follows the federal rule and the great weight of
59. Silloway v. Jorgensen, 146 Mont. 307, 310, 406 P.2d 167, 169 (1965).
60. MoNT. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (emphasis added).
61. Hereford v. Hereford, - Mont. -, 598 P.2d 600 (1979).
62. Id. at -, 598 P.2d at 602.
63. Id. In Hereford, ex-husband Charles filed for an accounting to recover excess child
support payments, alleging that he overpaid his child support obligation because he did not
receive full credit for Social Security payments made for his child's benefit. Ex-wife Mar-
garet admitted receiving payments from both Charles and the Social Security Administra-
tion, but no amounts were alleged in her answer. Charles moved for summary judgment,
which motion Margaret resisted, but she made no countermotion. The district court entered
summary judgment for Margaret. Id. at -, 598 P.2d at 601. Charles was never given notice
of the district court's intent to grant summary judgment in favor of Margaret, or of the
grounds upon which the judgment was to based. The only issue addressed by Charles's mo-
tion was the excess payments. Id. at -, 598 P.2d at 602.
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authority on this question."'
Rule 56 does not expressly state whether summary judgment
may be entered in favor of a non-moving party. Rule 54(c), how-
ever, empowers the court to grant relief beyond that demanded in
the pleadings." While Rule 54(c) does not directly apply to sum-
mary judgment, where one party moves for summary judgment, it
is reasonable for the court to' enter summary judgment for the non-
moving party if the case warrants that result." A trial court should
not be precluded from entering summary judgment for a non-mo-
vant even if the non-movant vigorously contends that triable issues
exist.
Hereford's holding that a moving party must have notice and
opportunity to be heard before summary judgment can be entered
for a non-movant is consistent with prior Montana decisions. Al-
though the court faced the precise issue for the first time in Here-
ford,68 it had considered similar situations in Gravely v. MacLeod"9
and State ex rel. Department of Health and Environmental Sci-
ences v. City of Livingston. In both cases a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss was changed to a motion for summary judgment.7 1 Pro-
viding the movant an opportunity to present evidence on issues
not raised in his own motion comports with the function of sum-
mary judgment, which is not to try the facts of a case, but to deter-
mine whether there is a genuine issue of fact to be tried.7
64. 6 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAerica V 56.12, at 56-331 through -334 (2d ed. 1976).
65. MoNT. R. Civ. P. 54(c) provides:
A judgment by default shall not be different in kind from or exceed in amount
that prayed for in the demand for judgment. Except as to a party against whom a
judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to
which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not
demanded such relief in his pleadings.
66. See 6 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTicE V 56.12, at 56-331 (2d ed. 1976).
67. Id. at 56-334.
68. Hereford, - Mont. -, 598 P.2d at 602.
69. - Mont. -, 573 P.2d 1166, 1169 (1978).
70. 169 Mont. 431, 435-36, 548 P.2d 155, 157-58 (1976).
71. MoNT. R. Civ. P. 12(b) provides in part:
If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the
pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the
pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and
all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made per-
tinent to such motion by Rule 56.
72. Johnson v. Johnson, 172 Mont. 150, 154, 561 P.2d 917, 919 (1977) (summary judg-
ment is not a substitute for trial; it can only be granted where the record shows no genuine
issue of material fact). See also 6 MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcTICE 56.04[11], at 56-67 (2d ed.
1976).
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II. EVIDENCE
A. Dead Man's Statute
On July 10, 1979, the Montana Supreme Court issued an or-
der's declaring certain statutes superseded by the Montana Rules
of Evidence. Among the statutes declared superseded was the
Montana dead man's statute.74 The court had previously invali-
dated the dead man's statute by implication when it adopted the
Rules of Evidence,7 5 and the Montana Legislative Council ac-
knowledged this fact by excluding the statute from the Montana
Code Annotated. In addition, two decisions prior to the supreme
court's July 10 order, Cremer v. Cremer Rodeo Land and Livestock
Co." and McNulty v. Bewley Corp.,77 expressly recognized that the
Rules of Evidence superseded the dead man's statute.78
Commentators have been virtually unanimous in condemning
dead man's statutes on the grounds that they breed litigation, and
while preventing enforcement of honest claims, they are ineffective
to prevent perjury by witnesses who do not fall within the limited
scope of the statutes.7 Notwithstanding this widespread criticism,
most jurisdictions have retained their dead man's acts.80 Montana's
adoption of the minority position is in accord with the policy of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, which rejects the disqualification of
73. In the Matter of the Montana Supreme Court Commission on Rules of Evidence,
No. 12729, 36 St. Rptr. 1647 (Montana Supreme Court, July 10, 1979) (per curiam).
74. REVISED CODES OF MONTANA (1947) [hereinafter cited as R.C.M. 1947] § 93-701-
3(3),(4). In essence the statute disqualified a witness from testifying about transactions and
oral conversations between the witness and a person or agent now dead, in actions against
the deceased's estate or principal, respectively. There were two statutory exceptions to the
rule which allowed testimony: (1) when the court feels that injustice would result from ex-
cluding the testimony, and (2) if the executor or principal first introduces the testimony.
75. MONT. R. Evjn. 601(a) states that every person is qualified to be a witness, unless
disqualified under Rule 601(b). The dead man's statute is impliedly superseded by Rule
601(a) since its provisions do not appear in 601(b). See also the Commission Comment to
Rule 601(a), which contains an extensive discussion of the dead man's rule, and Table B,
appended to the rules. The court's authority to invalidate the statute derives from MONT.
CONST. art. VII, § 2, cl. 3, which provides: "The supreme court may make rules governing
* . . practice and procedure for all other courts .... Rules of procedure shall be subject to
disapproval by the legislature in either of the two sessions following promulgation." Also,
MCA § 3-2-706 (1979) provides that upon adoption of any rules of procedure and practice,
"such laws and rules insofar as they are in conflict therewith shall thereafter be of no fur-
ther force and effect." The Rules of Evidence were adopted December 29, 1976. The legisla-
ture did not disapprove of the rules in either 1977 or 1979.
76. - Mont. -' 592 P.2d 485 (1978).
77. - Mont. , 596 P.2d 474 (1979).
78. Cremer, - Mont. -. , 592 P.2d at 489; McNulty, - Mont. -, 596 P.2d at 476.
79. WNSTmN'S EVIDENCE 1 601[03], at 601-18 (1978). See also the Commission Com-
ment to MONT. R. EVID. 601.
80. WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 601[03], at 601-18 (1978).
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witnesses on account of interest.8'
B. Subsequent Repairs: Rule 407
As early as 1901 Montana recognized the general rule that evi-
dence of a defendant's repair of a dangerous condition following an
accident is inadmissible to show his negligence in failing to make
earlier repair."e For many years, however, it seemed that the rule
prohibiting admission of evidence of subsequent repairs had been
swallowed by its exceptions. Case law established exceptions al-
lowing evidence of subsequent repairs to show that the defendant
controlled the defective condition and had a duty to repair it, s to
rebut testimony by the defendant that repair was impracticable,"
and to show conditions as they existed at the time of the acci-
dent. 5 This last exception was established in Pullen v. City of
Butte 6 in 1912. The Pullen exception is so broad that it virtually
destroys the rule of inadmissibility, since in every case there will
be a need to show what conditions existed at the time of the
injury.
Montana Rule of Evidence 407, which became effective July 1,
1977, now governs admission of evidence of subsequent repairs. It
neither condones nor rejects the Pullen exception, although the
commission comment indicates the exception still exists. 7 A recent
Montana Supreme Court case, however, raises the possibility that
application of the Pullen exception will be restricted under Rule
407.
Cech v. State, the first case to apply Rule 407 after its adop-
81. JONES ON EVIDENCE § 20:20 (6th ed. 1972). FED. R. EvID. 601 contains no provisions
similar to the dead man's statutes. The federal courts, however, defer to states having a
dead man's statute in effect when state law supplies the rule of decision in a case. See the
Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary, Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 601.
82. May v. City of Anaconda, 26 Mont. 140, 144, 66 P. 759, 761 (1901).
83. Id.
84. Lawlor v. County of Flathead, - Mont. -, 582 P.2d 751, 755 (1978).
85. Teesdale v. Anschutz Drilling Co., 138 Mont. 427, 439-40, 357 P.2d 4, 10-11 (1960);
Titus v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 47 Mont. 583, 589, 133 P. 677, 678-79 (1913); Pullen
v. City of Butte, 45 Mont. 46, 53, 121 P. 878, 879 (1912).
86. 45 Mont. 46, 53, 121 P. 878, 879 (1912).
87. Rule 407 states the general rule and provides an open-ended list of exceptions:
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would have
made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not
admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event.
This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when
offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of
precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment.
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tion,as was decided initially in August 1979.89 After rehearing, the
court reversed its decision.10 In the initial decision, two justices
held that where there is ample evidence of the conditions at the
scene of the accident, it is reversible error to admit evidence of
subsequent repairs to show what those conditions were."1 Justice
Shea specially concurred with the decision to reverse, but on dif-
ferent grounds.92 Two dissenting justices contended that the evi-
dence was admissible as an exception to the general rule to show
feasibility of repair and as impeachment testimony. 3
On rehearing, a unanimous court adopted the rationale of the
dissent, finding admission of the evidence to show feasibility of re-
pair and for impeachment to be supported both by prior case law
and Rule 407.9 The court did not discuss whether the evidence
would have been admissible had it been offered solely to show con-
ditions at the time of the accident. The court did rely, however, on
Lawlor v. County of Flathead,95 which recognized the Pullen ex-
ception. 6 The initial Cech decision indicates that although at least
two justices are prepared to recognize the Pullen exception as al-
lowable under Rule 407, the exception would apply only where evi-
dence is not otherwise available to show conditions at the time of
the accident.'7
88. The court considered the admission of evidence of remedial measures, but did not
discuss Rule 407, in Lawlor v. County of Flathead, - Mont. -, 582 P.2d 751 (1978).
Lawlor was tried before the rule was adopted, but appealed after the rule took effect. In Hill
v. Squibb & Sons, E.R., - Mont. -, 592 P.2d 1383, 1388 (1979), the court rejected a claim
that Rule 407 applied to a medical pamphlet which had not been published by the
defendant.
89. - Mont. __, 598 P.2d 584 (1979).
90. - Mont. -, 604 P.2d 97 (1979).
91. Cech, __ Mont. -, 598 P.2d at 588. This is more restrictive than the approach
taken in prior cases. In Pullen, the court found the evidence admissible because it "tended
to throw some light upon the physical conditions existing at the time of the accident."
Pullen, 45 Mont. at 53, 121 P. at 879. None of the cases decided before adoption of Rule 407
limited the Pullen exception to situations where other evidence was unavailable to show
conditions at the time of the accident.
92. Id. at -, 598 P.2d at 592-93.
93. Id. at , 598 P.2d at 590, 592. Justice Sheehy wrote the dissent, with Justice Daly
concurring.
94. Cech, - Mont. -, 604 P.2d at 101-02.
95. - Mont. -, 582 P.2d 751 (1978).
96. Id. at -, 582 P.2d at 755. In Lawlor the court cited the Pullen exception with
approval, but did not apply it in that case.
97. This approach is consistent with MoNT. R. EVID. 403, which allows the exclusion of
evidence where "its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues ... or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." The
Commission Comment to Rule 407 states that "admission of evidence of subsequent repairs
for another purpose should be made under the considerations of Rule 403, particularly its
prejudicial effects."
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C. Opinion Testimony: Rules 701, 703, and 705
In four recent cases, the Montana court liberally interpreted
the rules governing opinion testimonye" so as to give trial courts
wide latitude in the admission of expert and lay opinion evidence.
The court has made it clear that Montana Rule of Evidence
70399 allows expert testimony to be based on hearsay.100 In Hun-
saker v. Bozeman Deaconess Foundation, the court held that a
doctor may rely on medical records, other documents, and his con-
versations with other doctors in reaching an opinion on the stan-
dard of medical care in a geographic area.101 The court extended
that rule in Azure v. City of Billings, deciding that medical opin-
ion can be based in part on a police report.10 2 Further, it is permis-
sible for a general practitioner to testify against a medical special-
ist.108 The training of the expert and the basis of his testimony
goes to the weight of the evidence and not its admissibility.1 4
Under Rule 705,105 the expert need not reveal the source of his
testimony on direct examination. In Stewart v. Casey, the court
noted: "[I]f opposing counsel believe the opinion is not founded on
sufficient data, cross-examination is the shield to guard against un-
warranted opinions."'' 0
The rules also have expanded the number of circumstances in
which lay testimony is permissible. In State v. Bier,07 a defendant
charged with negligent homicide sought to testify on the angle of a
gun shot. This evidence was excluded at trial on the ground that
the complexity of the subject required expert testimony. The su-
98. The admission of expert and lay opinion testimony is governed by MONT. R. EVID.
701-705.
99. Rule 703 states:
The facts or data in a particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hear-
ing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in a particular field in forming
opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible
in evidence.
100. Even before adoption of the Montana Rules of Evidence, the court held that
medical testimony must of necessity in some cases be based on hearsay. See Klaus v.
Hillberry, 157 Mont. 277, 296, 485 P.2d 54, 59 (1971).
101. - Mont. -, 588 P.2d 493, 504-05 (1978).
102. - Mont. -, 596 P.2d 460, 471-72 (1979).
103. Hunsaker, - Mont. -, 588 P.2d at 503.
104. Id. at -, 588 P.2d at 505; Azure, __ Mont. -, 596 P.2d at 472.
105. Rule 705 provides:
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give his reasons there-
for without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the court re-
quires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underly-
ing facts or data on cross-examination.
106. - Mont. -, 595 P.2d 1176, 1180 (1979).
107. - Mont. -, 591 P.2d 1115, 1119 (1979).
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preme court disagreed: 08 "Rule 701 permits lay opinion so long as
rationally based on perceived facts and helpful to an understand-
ing of testimony or facts. Cross-examination in the normal case is
considered to sufficiently safeguard the testimony from infirmi-
ties." While previous Montana case law has allowed lay opinion,10°
Bier indicates that under the rules such testimony will be allowa-
ble in a broader range of circumstances. 110
D. Polygraph Evidence
Virtually all jurisdictions reject the results of lie detector tests
as evidence to prove the guilt or innocence of one accused of crime,
whether offered by the prosecution or the accused.' The most
common reason given for prohibiting polygraph evidence is that
polygraphs have not been proven reliable.11 2 Montana adheres to
this rationale. " '
State v. McClean"4 raises a secondary question with respect
to polygraph evidence-whether the mere mention of a polygraph
test taken by a prosecution witness is grounds for a mistrial. In
McClean, defense counsel attempted to impeach a policeman by
asking him whether he smoked marijuana. The policeman replied,
"No, Sir, as a matter of fact, I took a polygraph." The district
judge denied defense counsel's motion for a mistrial.1
5
On appeal the Montana Supreme Court upheld the denial,
108. Id. at -, 591 P.2d at 1119. However, the court found exclusion of the evidence
to be harmless error.
109. See Wilson v. Wilson, 128 Mont. 511, 517, 278 P.2d 219, 222 (1954), rev'd on
other grounds, Trudgen v. Trudgen, 134 Mont. 174, 187, 329 P.2d 225, 232 (1958), in which
the court relied on 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 455 in stating that the " 'ordinary observer'" is
qualified to give opinion evidence "'if it appears to the presiding judge that he has had
sufficient opportunities for drawing the inference which he proposes to state, and possesses
the capacity necessary to make and state it.'"
110. In Bier, the court indicated that it would have reached a different conclusion but
for adoption of the Montana Rules of Evidence. - Mont. -, 591 P.2d at 1119.
111. 29 Am. JR. 2d Evidence § 831 (1967). New Mexico allows polygraph evidence if
offered by a defendant in a criminal case on the grounds that to prohibit the evidence would
amount to a denial of due process. State v. Dorsey, 88 N.M. 184, 185, 539 P.2d 204, 205
(1975).
112. Note, Truth by Ordeal: The Growing Acceptance of Polygraphy, 6 FLA. ST. U. L.
REv. 1373, 1380 (1978). The note criticizes this rationale, advanced in the seminal case in
the field of polygraph evidence, Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
"The thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." Id.
113. In State v. Hollywood, 138 Mont. 561, 575, 358 P.2d 437, 444 (1960), the court
stated, "Until it is established that reasonable certainty follows from such tests, it would be
error to admit in evidence the results thereof."
114. - Mont. -, 587 P.2d 20 (1978).
115. Id. at -, 587 P.2d at 22.
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stating "[D]espite general policy against the use of polygraph evi-
dence, the issue must be framed in terms of its prejudicial effect on
the defendant."116 The court found that any actual prejudice to the
defendant was minimal, since the policeman's response referred
only to his own use of marijuana and dealt only indirectly with
charges against the defendant.
1 7
Although not cited in McClean, the supreme court had
reached a similar conclusion in State v. Cor."5 There the court re-
fused to rule that the very mention of "polygraph" or "lie detec-
tor" is per se reversible error.11 9 Instead, the court held that a
prosecution witness' mention of polygraph tests given to defen-
dant's alibi witnesses was not so prejudicial as to warrant rever-
sal. 20 Cor arguably presented more potential prejudice than Mc-
Clean, since in Cor the polygraph tests involved were those given
to the defendant's witnesses. In light of the court's holding in Cor,
the result in McClean is not surprising.
The Montana Supreme Court has considered polygraph evi-
dence in only four other cases. 21 In Gropp v. Lotton,1 22 a civil ac-
tion to quiet title to real estate, the court rejected plaintiff's offer
of polygraph evidence, stating that few jurisdictions allow poly-
graph tests in criminal actions and even fewer consider such evi-
dence in civil actions. 23
In State v. Campbell,1" the court reaffirmed State v.
Hollywood, 2 5 which held that the results of polygraph tests are not
116. Id. at -, 587 P.2d at 23. The court relied on Gafford v. State, 440 P.2d 405, 411
(Alas. 1968). See also Hutchins v. State, 334 So.2d 112, 113-14 (Fla. App. 1976); State v.
Marquez, 113 Ariz. 540, 544, 558 P.2d 692, 696 (1977). Cf. State v. Davis, 351 So.2d 771, 772-
73 (La. 1977) (reference to polygraph not always reversible error, but there was reversible
error where the witness' credibility was of vital importance to the state's case); Kaminski v.
State, 63 So.2d 339, 341 (Fla. 1953) (reversible error to mention polygraph taken by victim,
the only prosecution witness who could identify the defendant); Robinson v. State, 550
S.W.2d 54, 61 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (prejudicial error when prosecutor mentioned poly-
graph test taken'by accomplice, upon whose testimony the state's case depended).
117. - Mont. -, 587 P.2d at 23. The court further stated that the mention of the
polygraph may have bolstered the witness' credibility, but it did not appear to have done so
"except perhaps to rehabilitate him from a potentially highly prejudicial attempt at im-
peachment." Id.
118. 144 Mont. 323, 396 P.2d 86 (1964).
119. The court stated that a "per se reversible error" rule was urged by the defendant.
Id. at 348, 396 P.2d at 99.
120. Id. at 350, 396 P.2d at 100.
121. State v. Hollywood, 138 Mont. 561, 358 P.2d 437 (1960); Gropp v. Lotton, 160
Mont. 415, 503 P.2d 661 (1972); State v. Campbell, - Mont. -, 579 P.2d 1231 (1978); In
re T.Y.K. and D.A.W.R., - Mont. __, 598 P.2d 593 (1979).
122. 160 Mont. 415, 503 P.2d 661 (1972).
123. Id. at 424-25, 503 P.2d at 666.
124. - Mont. -, 579 P.2d 1231 (1978).
125. 138 Mont. 561, 575, 358 P.2d 437, 444 (1960).
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admissible as evidence in a criminal trial. 2 In Campbell the court
specifically reserved the issue whether Montana should follow Wis-
consin's lead to allow polygraph evidence under the conditions set
forth in State v. Stanislawski:"17 (1) the use of polygraphs are
within the prosecutor's discretion; (2) the prosecution and defense
stipulate in writing to the admission of the polygraph; and (3) not-
withstanding the stipulation, admissibility is within the sound dis-
cretion of the trial court.1 8
In re T. Y.K. and D.A. W.R. 29 is the most recent Montana de-
cision that mentions polygraph evidence. There the court again de-
clined to decide whether polygraphs are admissible by stipulation
because the appellants raised the issue for the first time on
appeal. 130
One-third of the states admit polygraph evidence by stipula-
tion of both parties. 18 Admission by stipulation is theoretically in-
consistent with the "unreliability" rationale excluding polygraphs,
since stipulation cannot be said to overcome such a defect. 12 Be-
cause the Montana Court adheres to the unreliability rationale,' 33
it is unclear whether it will follow the trend in favor of stipulated
admission of polygraph evidence.
126. Campbell, - Mont. -, 579 P.2d at 1234.
127. 62 Wis.2d 730, 216 N.W.2d 8 (1974).
128. See Campbell, - Mont. -, 579 P.2d at 1234 for a discussion of the Stanislaw-
ski criteria.
129. - Mont. -, 598 P.2d 593 (1979).
130. Id. at -, 598 P.2d at 596.
131. Note, Truth by Ordeal: The Growing Acceptance of Polygraphy, 6 FLA. ST. U. L.
REv. 1373, 1382 (1978).
132. Id. The note's author concludes that admission by stipulation points to a trend in
favor of admissibility, since stipulation does not improve the reliability, accuracy, weight, or
prejudicial value of polygraph evidence.
133. See notes 113 & 125 supra. The unreliability rationale persists in most jurisdic-
tions despite significant technological advances in polygraphy since Frye v. United States,
293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). A commonly cited reference containing a good discussion of the
development is T. REID & F. INDAU, TRUTH AND DECEPTION (2d ed. 1977). An explanation for
the reluctance of courts to accept polygraph results may lie in a judicial belief that a trier of
fact will give inordinate weight to such evidence. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 207 (2d ed.
1972). Reluctance to entrust key participation in the legal factfinding process to
polygraphers who are not under effective judicial control is also a factor. Id. n. 12. See, e.g.,
Kaminski v. State, 63 So.2d 339, 341 (Fla. 1953) (admitting the evidence resulted in the
"substitution of a mechanical device, without fair opportunity for cross-examination, for the
time-tested, time-tried, and time-honored discretion of the . . . jury as to matters of credi-
bility"). A few recent federal cases may signal a trend away from the unreliability standard,
but their import is not clear. See generally Note, State v. Souel: Ohio Turns the Corner on
Polygraph Evidence, 8 CAPITAL U.L. REv. 287 (1978); Note, Truth by Ordeal: The Growing
Acceptance of Polygraphy, 6 FLA.-ST. U.L. REv. 1373 (1978).
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E. Corroboration of Accomplice Testimony
1. Introduction
Montana has long required corroboration of accomplice testi-
mony in order to uphold a criminal conviction.1 3 4 The statute em-
bodying the rule has remained virtually unchanged since the Ban-
nack Statutes.1 1 5 Despite its long existence, the rule is still a
frequent source of litigation." '
The Montana Supreme Court has not consistently applied the
corroboration statute, which may account for some of the litigation
on this issue. Five relevant decisions were handed down during the
survey period. " Of these five, three offer useful guidance as to
how the rule operates. State v. Owens" 8 and State v. Williams3 9
illustrate the nature and quantum of independent evidence suffi-
cient to corroborate accomplice testimony. State v. Kemp1 4 0 is a
well-analyzed case where the court found the independent evi-
dence insufficient to implicate the defendant. The remaining two
cases do little to clarify the rule. State v. Standley14 1 only confuses
the rule, and State v. Holliday 14 finds the rule satisfied without
134. At common law it is well settled that the testimony of an accomplice, although
entirely without corroboration, will support a verdict unless the testimony appears on its
face to be preposterous or self-contradictory. 30 AM. JUR. 2d Evidence § 1151 (1967). The
common law rule has been changed in many jurisdictions by statutes expressly declaring
that uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice cannot sustain a conviction. Id., citing
State v. Yegen, 86 Mont. 251, 283 P. 210 (1929).
135. MCA § 46-16-213 (1979) provides:
A conviction cannot be had on the testimony of one responsible or legally account-
able for the same offense, as defined in 45-2-301, unless the testimony is corrobo-
rated by other evidence which in itself and without the aid of the testimony of the
one responsible or legally accountable for the same offense tends to connect the
defendant with the commission of the offense. The corroboration is not sufficient
if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof.
The only amendment made since the statute's adoption is the substitution of "one responsi-
ble or legally accountable for the same offense" for "accomplice," to be consistent with the
language of the Montana Criminal Code of 1973 (MCA Title 45). The statute was previously
codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 95-3012 (Supp. 1977); R.C.M. 1947, § 94-7220; R.C.M. 1921, §
11388; R.C.M. 1907, § 9290; MONT. PENAL CODE 1895, § 2089 (Bannack).
136. See, e.g., the extensive list of annotations to the relevant sections in the R.C.M.
1947. The Pacific Digest contains over forty Montana cases on the subject, the earliest being
Territory v. Corbett, 3 Mont. 50 (1877).
137. In a sixth case, State v. Harvey, - Mont. __, 603 P.2d 661 (1979), defendant
raised the corroboration issue, but the supreme court did not examine the evidence for cor-
roboration because it found that the witness in question was not an accomplice. Id. at -,
603 P.2d at 666.
138. - Mont. -' 597 P.2d 72 (1979).
139. - Mont. -' 604 P.2d 1224 (1979).
140. - Mont. , 597 P.2d 96 (1979).
141. - Mont. -' 586 P.2d 1075 (1978).
142. - Mont. -' 598 P.2d 1132 (1979).
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explaining what specific independent evidence corroborated the ac-
complice testimony. A brief review of Montana case law interpret-




State v. Cobb. 4 is frequently cited for a complete statement of
the Montana corroboration rule:
(a) The corroborative evidence may be supplied by the defen-
dant or his witnesses.
(b) It need not be direct evidence-it may be circumstantial.
(c) It need not extend to every fact to which the accomplice
testifies.
(d) It need not be sufficient to justify a conviction or to estab-
lish a prima facie case of guilt.
(e) It need not be sufficient to connect the defendant with the
commission of the crime; it is sufficient if it tends to do so.
(f) Whether the corroborative evidence tends to connect defen-
dant with the commission of the offense is a question of law, but
the weight of the evidence-its efficacy to fortify the testimony of
the accomplice and render his story trustworthy-is a matter for
the consideration of the jury. 144
Earlier cases generally provide little guidance as to how these
rules apply to specific fact situations. Typically they discuss the
rule to be applied, then merely state, without pointing to specific
items of evidence, that the rule is either satisfied or not satisfied.
'4 5
A notable exception is State v. Spotted Hawk.1 46 That case
involved the murder of a sheepherder in unsettled cattle country.
The court found that most of the corroborative evidence did not
satisfy the statute (then § 2089 of the Penal Code) because it relied
on the accomplice testimony for meaning and was therefore not
143. 76 Mont. 89, 245 P. 265 (1926).
144. Id. at 92, 245 P. at 266. It must be noted that Cobb is not the original source of
the rules listed. Rather, the case collects the principles that emerged from prior cases. For
similar summaries of the rules, See also State v. Ritz, 65 Mont. 180, 186-87, 211 P. 298, 300
(1922); State v. Bolton, 65 Mont. 74, 87-88, 212 P. 504, 508 (1922).
145. See, e.g., State v. Ritz, 65 Mont. 180, 187, 211 P. 298, 300 (1922); State v. Lawson,
44 Mont. 488, 491, 120 P. 808, 808 (1912); State v. Biggs, 45 Mont. 400, 406, 123 P. 410, 412
(1912); State v. Stevenson, 26 Mont. 332, 334, 67 P. 1001, 1002 (1902); State v. Welch, 22
Mont. 92, 98, 55 P. 927, 930 (1899). But see State v. Bolton, 65 Mont. 74, 212 P. 504 (1922);
State v. Spotted Hawk, 22 Mont. 33, 55 P. 1026 (1899); and State v. Geddes, 22 Mont. 68, 55
P. 919 (1899) (all of which contain analysis of specific evidence in applying the rules of law).
146. 22 Mont. 33, 55 P. 1026 (1899).
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independent.1 7 There was independent evidence, however, that
placed the defendant in the general area of the crime, and arguably
established a motive for the killing." " The court apparently did
not consider this evidence substantial enough to warrant submis-
sion to the jury, which indicates to some extent the quantum of
evidence required to satisfy the statute.
b. 1926 to Present
Cases decided after Cobb often contain adequate examination
of specific independent evidence and offer useful guidance to de-
termine the quantity and quality of evidence required to satisfy
the statute. Initially the standard to measure the sufficiency of evi-
dence was whether there is "substantial testimony, aside from the
uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice, to justify a judgment of
conviction."" 9 This standard is consistent with Spotted Hawk.
Subsequent cases interpreted the "tend to connect" require-
ment. State v. Jones 60 adopted a negative approach: "The mere
showing of opportunity. . . is not enough, and where the facts and
circumstances relied upon for corroboration are as consistent with
innocence as with guilt, a conviction must be set aside.""' The
court applied a similar negative standard in State v. Keckonen"
2
and State v. Gangner," both of which involved prosecutions for
sodomy committed by adults with young boys, who were held to be
accomplices."4 The court in Keckonen, however, did not cite Jones
as precedent for the "equally-as-consistent-with-innocence" stan-
dard.65 Instead, it arrived at a similar statement by analogy to a
case involving circumstantial evidence." 6 Although substantial in-
147. Id. at 62, 55 P. at 1035.
148. An independent witness saw defendant and his accomplice shoot a cow, and he
also saw a white man discover them skinning the animal. The accomplice testified that the
group followed this white man and killed him to avoid being punished for killing the cow.
Id. at 60, 55 P. at 1034. The court in State v. Bolton, 65 Mont. 74, 87, 212 P. 504, 508 (1922)
held that it was proper to consider, on the corroboration issue, evidence that the defendant
was seen with the accomplice near in time and place to the crime, and that a motive existed.
See also State v. Jones, 95 Mont. 317, 325, 26 P.2d 341, 343 (1933).
149. State v. Yegen, 86 Mont. 251, 254, 283 P. 210, 211 (1929); State v. Keithley, 83
Mont. 177, 184, 271 P. 449, 452 (1928).
150. 95 Mont. 317, 26 P.2d 341 (1933).
151. Id. at 325, 26 P.2d at 343.
152. 107 Mont. 253, 84 P.2d 341 (1938).
153. 130 Mont. 533, 305 P.2d 338 (1957).
154. Keckonen, 107 Mont. at 255, 84 P.2d at 341-42; Gangner, 130 Mont. at 534, 305
P.2d at 339.
155. Ignoring Jones, the court purported to define "tend". for the first time in connec-
tion with the corroboration rule. Keckonen, 107 Mont. at 260, 84 P.2d at 344.
156. Id. at 261, 84 P.2d at 344. The court adapted for purposes of the corroboration
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dependent evidence was introduced in Keckonen, the court held
that it showed only an opportunity to commit the offense and was
therefore insufficient.
157
State v. Gangner'6 also included substantial independent evi-
dence, including discovery of the defendant and the boy accom-
plice unclothed in bed together, but the court again found that the
evidence showed no more than opportunity to commit the of-
fense.159 Gangner stretched the Jones-Keckonen "equally-as-con-
sistent-with-innocence" rule to its limit, demonstrating the near
impossibility of meeting the standard if it is strictly applied. Later
cases retreated from such a burdensome requirement.1 60
State v. Barick16' did not mention the Jones-Keckonen rule,
referring instead to the 1899 construction: "Evidence which 'tends
to connect' is that evidence which taken by itself leads to the infer-
ence, not only that a crime has been committed, but the prisoner is
implicated in it."'1 62 The court in Barick nonetheless applied a high
standard to test the sufficiency of the corroboration, which in-
cluded the defendant's admission to a third party of his involve-
ment in the crime. Without the admission, other substantial cor-
roborative evidence was considered insufficient. 6
Two recent cases illustrate the supreme court's vacillation in
applying the corroboration rules, both as to the quantity and char-
acter of evidence required. State v. Briner 6' applied a much less
demanding standard than Barick to find adequate corroboration.
65
In State v. Coleman'6 the court returned to the Jones-Keckonen
rule. The court applied the rule less restrictively than it had in
Gangner,767 finding adequate corroboration to send the case to the
jury.6 ' Some language in Coleman is misleading, however. The
court's statement that "the evidence does not establish any reason-
able explanation pointing toward innocent conduct"' 6 " certainly is
rule a definition of "tend" from Moffett v. Bozeman Canning Co., 95 Mont. 347, 362, 26
P.2d 973, 979 (1933) (Anderson, J., dissenting).
157. 107 Mont. at 263-64, 84 P.2d at 345.
158. 130 Mont. 533, 305 P.2d 338 (1957).
159. Id. at 535, 305 P.2d at 339.
160. See, e.g., State v. Coleman, - Mont. -, 579 P.2d 732, 748 (1978).
161. 143 Mont. 273, 389 P.2d 170 (1964).
162. Id. at 283, 389 P.2d at 175, citing State v. Geddes, 22 Mont. 68, 83, 55 P. 919, 924
(1899).
163. Barick, 143 Mont. at 283, 389 P.2d at 175.
164. 173 Mont. 185, 567 P.2d 35 (1977).
165. Id. at 191-92, 567 P.2d at 38-39.
166. - Mont. -, 579 P.2d 732 (1978).
167. See text accompanying note 158 supra.
168. Coleman, - Mont. -, 579 P.2d at 748.
169. Id. (emphasis added). Use of "establish" merely may be a bad choice of words,
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a turnaround from whether evidence is "equally consonant" with
innocence as with guilt.170 An appropriate standard is whether the
independent evidence points more likely to guilt than to innocence.
The foregoing discussion suggests a two-step analysis of cor-
roboration evidence. The first step focuses on the "tend to con-
nect" requirement: Does the independent evidence point to the de-
fendant? The Jones-Keckonen rule can be applied in this first
step. The second step focuses on the quantity of evidence that
passes the first test: Is the independent evidence that tends to con-
nect the defendant "substantial?" The court has never expressly
recognized these two branches of the corroboration rule, relying
sometimes on one or the other, sometimes on both. The court's
most recent discussions of the corroboration statute do not allevi-
ate this confusion.
3. Survey cases
State v. Standley7 1 involved the theft of 106 televisions from
a Ramada Inn. The thieves transported the stolen sets in a van,
which was parked temporarily on one Dosdall's property. Dosdall
in turn stole eight of the sets for himself from the thieves.1 72 The




The court cited Cobb, Keckonon, and Coleman for the rules to
be applied, but did not apply the rules in examining specific evi-
dence. The court held the following evidence sufficient to corrobo-
rate the accomplice testimony: 17 4 (1) Dosdall's employee testified
that he put the van on Dosdall's property, and helped Dosdall steal
the eight sets from the original thieves. The court did not consider
that the employee was also an accomplice, 17 nor did it explain how
this evidence implicated the defendant Standley. (2) Tires brought
in by the defendant for repair were comparable in size to tracks
found near the warehouse from which the televisions were stolen.
not intended to change the rule. If so, such imprecision adds to uncertainty in what is al-
ready a cloudy area.
170. Keckonen, 107 Mont. 253, 261, 84 P.2d 341, 344 (1938).
171. - Mont. -, 586 P.2d 1075 (1978).
172. Id. at -, 586 P.2d at 1075-76.
173. Id. at -, 586 P.2d at 1077. The trial court instructed the jury that Dosdall was
an accomplice, and the defendant did not object to this instruction. The supreme court
apparently treated Dosdall and the defendant Standley as accomplices in the same crime.
174. Id. at -, 586 P.2d at 1077. Again the court said that the independent corrobora-
tive evidence did not "establish any reasonable explanation pointing toward innocent con-
duct." Id. (emphasis added). See notes 169 & 170 and accompanying text supra.
175. One accomplice can't corroborate another. State v. Bolton, 65 Mont. 74, 88, 212
P. 504, 509 (1922).
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The tires were not described as unusual in size, and the court did
not explain how they implicated the defendant more than any
other motorist with flat tires of that size. (3) The tires were
brought in for repairs one day after Dosdall said the defendant re-
moved them from the van. Since the significance of the timing de-
pended on Dosdall's testimony, this evidence was not independent.
(4) The defendant drove a Toyota truck, just as Dosdall described.
Again, this depended on Dosdall's testimony for its significance.
(5) The eight sets found in Dosdall's house were identified as sto-
len from the Ramada Inn. This evidence alone cannot be said to
implicate Standley as the thief.
The evidence relied on by the court in Standley substantially
corroborated the accomplice testimony, but the court did not ask
two important preliminary questions: First, "Is the evidence inde-
pendent?" and second, "Does it point to the defendant?" The only
evidence that fits within the corroboration rule is the second item
listed above, that the tires brought in for repair were similar in size
to the tracks left at the scene of the crime. Taken alone, this would
not satisfy even the Spotted Hawk standard, let alone the Jones-
Keckonen rule.
State v. Owens176 offers a better discussion and application of
the corroboration rule. There an innocent companion of the defen-
dant and an accomplice testified to several facts which clearly im-
plicated the defendant in a bizarre murder. The court again cited
Cobb, Keckonon, and Coleman, but this time applied the princi-
ples of those cases. The court listed the corroborative evidence it
considered to test its sufficiency to support the conviction, and




State v. Kemp 78 involved the illegal sale of drugs in an elabo-
rate scheme described by an accomplice. 179 The court first dis-
176. - Mont. -, 597 P.2d 72 (1979).
177. Id. at -, 597 P.2d at 76. The independent evidence included the defendant's
purchase of shotgun shells on the day of the murder, and the fact that he had no license to
hunt. The same type of ammunition was used to kill the victim. The defendant also made
incriminating statements to the arresting officer. The two killers' female companion, who
was not involved in the killing, testified that the two brothers left together with the victim,
after threatening him if he wouldn't cooperate. Also, she testified that the two brothers
returned to their motel together after the murder and later dictated to her a list of items
stolen from the victim's car.
178. - Mont. -, 597 P.2d 96 (1979).
179. Id. at -, 597 P.2d at 97-98. The accomplice testified that she made a deal with
the defendant to buy $12,000 of methamphetamines. She then contacted others to partici-
pate, and they all met in a Livingston motel to close the deal. The following day, the defen-
dant brought back one ounce of the drugs, and the accomplice stored her share with a friend
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cussed the policy behind the corroboration statute:
[The accomplice] turned state's evidence in exchange for immu-
nity from prosecution. Since her consent to cooperate stemmed
from her desire to avoid prosecution, she cannot be said to be
without motive to fabricate. This factor, coupled with her status
as an admitted accomplice to the charge, renders the information
she provided particularly suspect.180
Then the court analyzed each item of evidence in light of the prin-
ciples stated in Keckonon, Gangner, and other cases.181 First,
motel records and the testimony of a friend who stored the accom-
plice's drugs did not meet the requirements of the corroboration
statute. Although they corroborated the accomplice on other mat-
ters, they did not point to the defendant.182 Second, testimony of
the banker who wired money for the drug purchase and the accom-
plice's ledger and address book were also discarded, since they de-
pended on the accomplice testimony for their significance.' 83 The
only independent evidence that fit within the statute was the near-
ness in time of the money wire and the drug deal. The court ac-
knowledged that this fact cast suspicion over the defendant, but
noted that suspicion and opportunity are not enough to corrobo-
rate accomplice testimony.'8
The court in State v. Holliday8 ' merely recited the rules set
out in Cobb and Coleman and with minimal examination found the
requirements of those rules met.'8 6 The court may have omitted
discussion because the same issue was dealt with in a related case,
but even that case is questionable in its analysis of the corrobora-
tive testimony.1
8 7
The latest Montana case dealing with corroboration of accom-
in Three Forks while she went to Bozeman. Money for the deal was wired from a North
Dakota bank.
180. Id. at -, 597 P.2d at 98.




185. - Mont. -, 598 P.2d 1132 (1979).
186. Id. at -, 598 P.2d at 1136.
187. See State v. Fitzpatrick, - Mont. -, 569 P.2d 383 (1977). Fitzpatrick and Hol-
liday were two of five codefendants who conspired to rob a supermarket in Hardin, Mon-
tana. The corroborative evidence in Fitzpatrick showed that the five defendants went in two
cars to Hardin at about the time the crime was committed, and customers in the store
noticed a car similar in color to one of the defendants' cars. Evidence of a bullet hole in the
windshield of one of the cars depended on an accomplice for its significance, and testimony
from a conspirator who did not go to Hardin was also considered. Fitzpatrick, - Mont. -,
569 P.2d at 394.
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plice testimony is State v. Williams, 8' which involved a conspiracy
to commit burglary and theft. After reciting a number of now fa-
miliar corroboration cases, the court focused on the "tend to con-
nect" requirement.8 9 The court then listed specific independent
evidence that corroborated the accomplice, and each item pointed
to the defendant.1 90 Williams illustrates well the type of evidence
required to satisfy the corroboration statute.
4. Summary and Conclusion
Recent Montana cases have done little to clarify the law relat-
ing to corroboration of accomplice testimony. Given the court's
treatment of this statutory requirement over its long history, clari-
fication is needed. The court has vacillated between strict and lib-
eral applications of judicial rules interpreting Montana's corrobo-
ration statute. This inconsistency invites further litigation on the
issue.
The court should establish a unified standard to apply to cor-
roboration cases. Kemp, Owen, and Williams are a good beginning.
The corroboration statute and prior case law suggest a three-step
analysis: First, determine whether the corroborative evidence is in-
dependent; that is, whether it depends on the accomplice testi-
mony for its meaning. Second, determine whether the independent
evidence points to the defendant. The Jones-Keckonen test is ap-
propriate here, if not applied too strictly.191 A proper standard for
applying the Jones-Keckonon rule is whether the evidence points
more likely to guilt than to innocence. 92 Finally, determine
whether the evidence which passes the first two steps is "substan-
tial." It should cast more than suspicion, but need not itself be
sufficient to support a verdict, or even establish probably cause.
188. - Mont. -, 604 P.2d 1224 (1979).
189. Id. at -, 604 P.2d at 1230.
190. Id. As to the burglary: (1) defendant had constructive possession of the stolen
stereo; (2) defendant admitted giving a gun to a woman, and the gun was identified as the
one stolen in the burglary; (3) defendant knew the victim and had had an opportunity to see
the stereo in the victim's home. As to the robbery: (1) defendant admitted being with the
perpetrators immediately before the robbery and for much of the preceding evening; (2)
defendant admitted going to the gas station that was robbed, and also that he loaned his car
to the robbers during the time they committed the crime; (3) half of a rope from an exercise
device (matching the rope used in the crime) was found under defendant's kitchen sink.
191. See text accompanying note 158 supra.
192. See text accompanying note 170 supra. This standard would not violate the
proof-beyond-reasonable-doubt requirement in criminal cases. The question of whether ac-
complice testimony is corroborated is only a preliminary question of law for the court. State
v. Kemp, - Mont. -, 597 P.2d at 99; State v. Jones, 95 Mont. at 324, 26 P.2d at 342. The
jury then considers the evidence with the accomplice testimony to decide whether guilt has
been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
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F. Other Crimes Evidence: Rule 404(b)
Three recent Montana Supreme Court cases have created
some uncertainty about the circumstances in which the state may
introduce evidence that the defendant previously committed other
crimes or wrongful acts. The first opinion, State v. Just,"15 grafts
strict procedural and foundation requirements onto Montana Rule
of Evidence 404(b).'9  However, State v. Patton"1s and State v.
Brubaker,"ee decided within a month and a half of Just, indicate
that the court may be adopting a less restrictive analysis of Rule
404(b).
1. Procedural Requirements
In Just, the court adopted a minority position followed by the
Minnesota courts"97 and established the following procedural safe-
guards: (1) the party seeking to introduce evidence that the defen-
dant committed other crimes or wrongful acts must notify the de-
fendant that the evidence will be offered and the purposes for
which it is to be admitted; (2) at the time of introduction of the
evidence, the trial court must explain to the jury the purpose of
the evidence and admonish it to weigh the evidence for only that
purpose; (3) in its final charge the court must instruct the jury that
the evidence was received for only the limited purpose earlier
stated, that the defendant is not being tried and cannot be con-
victed for any offense except that charged, and that the conviction
for other offenses may result in unjust double punishment. The
majority decided to impose these requirements prospectively
only.'" s Justice Shea dissented from this portion of the opinion.'"
193. - Mont. -, 602 P.2d 957 (1979). The opinion decided on September 17, 1979,
was written by District Judge WNW. Lessley, sitting in place of Justice Sheehy. Justice Shea
dissented.
194., Rule 404(b), which became effective in 1977, provides:
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or ab-
sence of mistake or accident.
195. - Mont. -, 600 P.2d 194 (1979). Patton was decided September 25, 1979. Jus-
tice Daly, who concurred in Just, wrote the opinion for a unanimous court.
196. - Mont. -, 602 P.2d 974 (1979).
197. Just, - Mont. -, 602 P.2d at 962-64. The Minnesota rule set forth in State v.
Billstrom, 276 Minn. 174, 178-79, 149 N.W.2d 281, 284-85 (1967) also has been adopted by
Louisiana and Oklahoma. State v. Prieur, 277 So.2d 126, 130 (La. 1973); Burks v. State, 594
P.2d 771, 774 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979).
198. Just, - Mont. -, 602 P.2d at 963.
199. Id. at -, 602 P.2d at 966.
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In Brubaker, the court reiterated its intention to apply the
procedural rules prospectively'" and imposed yet another require-
ment: "[T]he jury should be instructed that such prior [crimes]
. are circumstantial evidence of the defendant's guilt with re-
spect to the crime charged and the usual cautionary instructions
[should be] given with respect to the application and consideration
by a jury of circumstantial evidence. ' 20 1 The court did not state
whether this instruction would be required only on retrial of Bru-
baker or whether the court was establishing a rule for all future
cases.
Brubaker also clarified the foundation that must be laid
before introducing other crime evidence. The court criticized the
record because it did not show clearly how many prior crimes were
being ascribed to the defendant: "The evidence is most confusing.
One could conclude that the evidence shows at least five prior as-
saults, or it might be concluded that [the witnesses] . . . are all
describing one assault . . ,, . The court held that as "a matter
of proper foundation" the state must prove "with reasonable par-
ticularity and certainty the number of other assaults being testified
to . .. . 208
2. Requirements for Admissibility
In Just the court found that there is a "four element test to
determine the admissibility of evidence of other crimes:"2 (1) the
other crimes or acts must be similar to the one charge; (2) they
must be near in time to the crime charged; (3) they must tend to
establish a common scheme, plan or system; and (4) the prejudice
to the defendant must not substantially outweigh the probative
value of the evidence.
The fourth requirement simply restates Montana Rule of Evi-
dence 403.205 The other three elements are taken from State v.
200. Brubaker, - Mont. -, 602 P.2d at 981.
201. Id. at -, 602 P.2d at 982.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Just, - Mont. -, 602 P.2d at 961. Just deals with the admissibility of prior sex
offenses committed by the defendant against the prosecutrix. But the court does not ex-
pressly limit the case's applicability to this narrow factual setting. Further, the court cites as
support cases that involve varying types of offenses. See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 63 Mont. 106,
515 P.2d 695 (1973) (second-degree murder); State v. Frates, 160 Mont. 431, 503 P.2d 47
(1972) (sale of dangerous drugs). Both cases were cited in Just, - Mont. -, 602 P.2d at
960.
205. Rule 403 provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or mislead-
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Jensen,0 6 a pre-rules case, and unduly restrict application of Rule
404(b). To illustrate, Just and Jensen mandate that other crime
evidence establish a common scheme, plan, or system. However,
Rule 404(b) provides that such evidence is admissible for many
purposes, "such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, prepara-
tion, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident."
Patton does not apply the restrictions set forth in Just. In
Patton, the court decided that the other crime evidence was ad-
missible to show intent 07 and stated, without reference to Just,
that the Jensen requirements did not apply.2 8 The court retained
the Rule 403 mandate that the prejudicial value of the evidence
cannot substantially outweigh its probative value, which is consis-
tent with federal authority.20 9
While the result in Patton is sound, the court's reasoning is
unclear. The court stated that Jensen was inapplicable because:
This testimony was not offered to establish that defendant had
committed other crimes; it was offered to prove that before he
forceably assaulted her, defendant had verbally attempted to se-
duce the complaining witness. This being so, it was not crucial
that the State demonstrate "similarity of crimes or acts, nearness
in time, and tendency to establish a common scheme, plan or
system . ."21 0
However, the court failed to state how Patton differs from other
cases in which the Jensen test was applied. For instance, in Just,
as in Patton, the evidence was not admitted "to establish that de-
fendant had committed other crimes," and still the Jensen re-
quirements were imposed.
Brubaker adds to the confusion. The court, relying on a 1960
decision, repeated the requirements of Jensen that for "evidence
ing the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless pres-
entation of cumulative evidence.
206. 153 Mont. 233, 239, 455 P.2d 631, 634 (1969).
207. Patton, - Mont. __, 600 P.2d at 198.
208. Id. at -, 600 P.2d at 199. The discussion in Patton arguably is dictum since the
court found that the defendant's failure to properly object to the other crime evidence at
trial impaired his right to raise the issue on appeal.
209. Id. 10 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 404.21[2], at IV-114, -15 (2d ed. 1979) states:
Although the legislative history of subsection (b) favors admissibility, both the
legislative history and the Advisory Committee's Note leave considerable discre-
tion to the trial judge in admitting or excluding such evidence. The danger of
undue prejudice must be balanced against the probative value of the evidence in
making this determination. An accounting as to the availability of other means of
proof and factors discussed in Rule 403 is also helpful in ruling on the admission
of other crimes evidence.
210. Patton, - Mont. -, 600 P.2d at 199.
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of unrelated crimes to be admissible . . . it must appear that the
evidence of the other crimes tends to establish a common scheme,
plan, system, design or course of conduct similar to or closely con-
nected with the one charged" and not be too remote in time.2 1
The court stated that "[i]t appears that these earlier statements of
this Court have now been incorporated into rule 404(b) . ",212
Nevertheless, the court approved an instruction that would allow
other crime evidence to prove "defendant's possible motives, op-
portunities, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity," or ab-
sence of mistake or accident.2
The court's failure to recognize and resolve the conflict be-
tween the Jensen rule and Rule 404(b) raises uncertainty about
the purposes for which other crime evidence may be admitted.
While the court continues to cite the Jensen requirement that
other crime evidence is allowed to show only a common scheme,
plan, or design, Brubaker indicates that the court approves the
many other purposes listed in Rule 404(b).214
The problems raised in determining what other crimes are
similar and how recently they must have occurred make it desira-
ble to discard the Jensen test.2 5 In some cases, remoteness in time
211. Brubaker, - Mont. -, 602 P.2d at 981. The court cites State v. Merritt, 138
Mont. 546, 549, 357 P.2d 683, 684 (1960).
212. Brubaker, - Mont. -, 602 P.2d at 981.
213. Id. at -, 602 P.2d at 982.
214. Two cases decided less than a year before Just support the conclusion that the
court has in fact abandoned the Jensen rule. In State v. Leighty, - Mont. -, 588 P.2d
526, 530 (1978), the court held that Rule 404(b) permitted the use of other crime evidence to
show that the defendant acted with knowledge of the illegality of his conduct and not out of
mistake or accident. In State v. Gone, the court allowed other crime evidence to show "con-
sciousness of guilt" and criminal intent, stating, "The Commission Comment to this rule
notes that Montana law is consistent with the concept that purposes other than those listed
may be used to admit evidence of other crimes." - Mont. -, 587 P.2d 1291, 1295 (1978).
Further, neither Leighty nor Gone required that the other crime be similar to the one
charged; it is arguable that in both cases the previous acts that were held admissible were
dissimilar to the charges facing the defendants. In Leighty, the defendant was charged with
outfitting without a license. The "other crime" evidence concerned admission of written
documentation of the initial revocation of his license. Id. at -, 588 P.2d at 529-30. In
Gone, the defendant was tried for aggravated assault for firing a gun into a bar; the other
crime was resisting arrest and assaulting a highway patrolman. Id. at -, 587 P.2d at 1293-
95.
215. The similarity and time standards have been applied mechanically at times, lead-
ing to overly restrictive results. For instance, in a pre-rules case the court decided that an-
other assault by the defendants in the same city within a day of the crime charged was not
similar to that crime: "[T]o show defendants'... participation in other assaults on dissimi-
lar men at dissimilar places and for dissimilar purposes does not satisfy" the element of
similarity. State v. Crowl, 135 Mont. 98, 337 P.2d 367, 369 (1959). Crowl appears to require
the crimes be identical rather than similar. The court in Just, in considering how near in
time the prior act must be, stated: "[T]hree years before is close to the limit as being too
remote for probative value." Just, - Mont. -, 602 P.2d at 961. This approach is too
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and dissimilarity of crime may not destroy the probative value of
the evidence under Rule 404(b). In those cases in which the proba-
tive value is low, the evidence can be properly excluded under Rule
403.
Because of inconsistencies in prior Montana case law, it is
ironic that Just and Brubaker look to pre-rule authority for sup-
port. The Montana court changed its position on other crime evi-
dence at least three times before the rules became effective. The
court first adopted the general rule now embodied in Rule
404(b).2- Then, in 1952 it abolished altogether the admission of
evidence of other crimes.2 17 In 1969 Jensen firmly established the
restrictive three-pronged test that was relied upon in Just. This
test had been applied before Jensen, but not consistently.2 18
Adoption of the Montana Rules of Evidence gave the court a
chance to rid itself of Montana's restrictive position. Just appears
to reassert the Jensen test. However, Patton and Brubaker, de-
cided soon after Just, indicate that the court may give Rule 404(b)
a proper reading.
G. Hearsay: Rules 803 and 804
In State v. Brubaker,19 the Montana Supreme Court adopted
a narrow reading of three exceptions to the hearsay rule-the ex-
ceptions for statements made to a doctor for purposes of diagnosis
or treatment,2 20 the excited utterance exception,2 2 1 and the open-
ended exception of 804(b)(5) for hearsay evidence having a suffi-
cient guarantee of trustworthiness.22
Montana Rule of Evidence 803(4) allows admission of hearsay
statements "made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment
and describing . . . the inception or general character of the cause
or external source [of past or present symptoms] insofar as reason-
ably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment." In Brubaker, the defen-
dant was convicted of aggravated assault .22  The state sought to
inflexible; under the circumstances of particular cases, the probative value of a prior act
may decrease appreciably before or after three years.
216. See State v. Cassill, 70 Mont. 433, 439-40, 227 P. 49, 52 (1924).
217. State v. Searle, 125 Mont. 467, 471, 239 P.2d 995, 997 (1952).
218. The requirements of similarity and proximity in time had been applied sporadi-
cally by the court before Jensen. For example, these requirements were applied in State v.
Merritt, 138 Mont. 546, 549-50, 357 P.2d 683, 684 (1960), but were omitted from the court's
discussion in State v. Tully, 148 Mont. 166, 168-69, 418 P.2d 549, 550 (1966).
219. - Mont. -, 602 P.2d 974 (1979).
220. Id. at -, 602 P.2d at 978-79.
221. Id. at -, 602 P.2d at 979-80.
222. Id.
223. Id. at -, 602 P.2d at 975.
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show that the victim had told her doctor that injuries she had suf-
fered prior to the beating at issue had been inflicted by the defen-
dant.224 Even though the doctor in Brubaker testified that his in-
quiries as to the cause of the victim's injuries were important in
determining the method of treatment,221 5 the court found the foun-
dation inadequate.2 6 The court indicated that the foundation
might have been sufficient had the doctor been asked how he used
the information for diagnosis or treatment.22 7 The fact that suffi-
cient grounds for admitting the evidence were stated in an in-
chambers conference did not remedy the lack of foundation in the
presentation before the jury.
21
Testimony by the victim's mother also was found inadmissi-
ble. The neighbor testified that "one night Sharon [the victim] had
tcome pounding on her door to be let in. [The neighbor] testified
that Sharon looked a mess and 'had her jaw out as big as a foot-
ball,' and that Sharon said Jim had beaten her. [The neighbor]
also testified to a subsequent occasion. . . when Sharon had come
to her bar and . . . told her that 'Jim [the defendant] was after
her.' ",229
The court stated that even if Sharon were considered an un-
available witness because of her poor physical condition at the
time of trial,230 the, evidence still would not be admissible under
Rule 804(b)(5). That rule allows admission of hearsay evidence
where the person who made the statement cannot testify23 1 and the
statement, although not covered specifically by any of the excep-
tions in 804(b), has "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness"
that are comparable to those of the stated exceptions. The court
224. Id. at -, 602 P.2d at 979.
225. Id. The doctor testified as follows:
"Q. Did you inquire as to what happened to her? A. Yes, I asked the statement,
what had happened to her. Q. Now was it important for you to know in determi-
nation as to what to do next and how to treat her? A. Only insofar as pertaining to
my field. Q. And that is to the mouth? A. To the mouth and jaws. Q. And there
was injury to the mouth? A. Slight."
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. Chief Justice Haswell, dissenting, stated that repetition of the foundation
before the jury was not essential because the foundation had been laid and the evidence
ruled admissible in chambers. "A repetition of the foundation testimony before the jury,
while perferable, was not essential to any function of the jury at trial." Id. at -, 602 P.2d
at 983.
229. Id. at -' 602 P.2d at 979.
230. Id. at -' 602 P.2d at 976, 980. Sharon, who suffered a severe head injury, testi-
fied at trial from a wheelchair even though it appeared that her speech was quite impaired.
231. MONT. R. EvID. 804(a) lists those situations in which the declarant is considered
unavailable as a witness.
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found that the victim's hearsay statement did not have "compara-
ble circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, because in this
case the testimony of her statements comes from [the neighbor],
who admittedly does not like [the defendant].
s23 2
This rationale misconstrues Rule 804(b)(5); what is at issue is
the trustworthiness of the declarant's statement-not the trust-
worthiness of the witness who is testifying as to the content of the
declarant's statement.238 Judge Weinstein notes in his commentary
on the Federal Rules of Evidence:234 "In order to determine relia-
bility, 'a trier must be able to determine the credibility of the ex-
trajudicial declarant when he made the statement attributed to
him. .... ' "s235 This determination is important because under Rule
804(b)(5) the declarant will be unavailable for cross-examination to
expose inaccuracies in his perception and memory.2 3 6 However, the
witness who is repeating the declarant's hearsay statement is avail-
able for cross-examination. The credibility of the witness is a ques-
tion for the trier of fact, and the witness' possible bias should not
disqualify him altogether.3 1
Without reference to Rule 803(2), the court in Brubaker also
found the neighbor's testimony to be inadmissible as an "excited
232. Id. at -, 602 P.2d at 980.
233. The Commission Comments to the Montana Rules of Evidence support this anal-
ysis. The Commission Comment to Rule 804(b)(5) states that the comment to Rule 803(24)
applies. The comment to Rule 803(24) notes that the criteria for determining trustworthi-
ness are those factors set out in the comments to the other Rule 803 hearsay exceptions.
Those comments focus on the trustworthiness of the declarant's statements. For example,
the comments to the first three exceptions in Rule 803 emphasize that the spontaneity of
the declarant's statement reduces the chance that he is making a deliberate mis-
representation.
234. FED. R. EvID. 803(24) is more stringent than the Montana rule. The federal rule
requires that the statement be offered as evidence of a material fact, that it be more proba-
tive on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence, that the general purposes
of the rules and interests of justice be served, and that notice be given to the adversary. The
Commission Comment to Montana Rule 803(24) states that the federal requirements were
not adopted because they were "too restrictive."
235. WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 803(24)(01], at 803-292 (1979) (emphasis added).
236. Cf. WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE V 803(24)[01], at 803-291 (1979) where it is noted that
the judge may want to disallow evidence under Rule 803(24) if he believes that cross-exami-
nation "is needed to expose inaccuracies in the perception, memory and narration of the
declarant."
237. MoNT. R. EvID. 607 allows impeachment of a witness by any party. The Commis-
sion Comment notes that traditional methods of impeachment include evidence of bias for
or against any party involved in the case. Rule 601, which provides for disqualification of
witnesses, does not provide for disqualification simply upon a showing of bias. 10 MooRE's
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 601.07, at VI-25, -27 (2d ed. 1979) states that credibility is largely a
jury question although the judge could exclude the evidence if he determines "no one" could
believe a witness. Nothing in Brubaker suggests, however, that the neighbor's bias against
the defendant was so great that her testimony was completely unbelievable.
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utterance." '238 Rule 803(2) provides that an excited utterance is a
"statement relating to a startling event or condition made while
the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the
event or condition." Even though the declarant in this case argua-
bly was speaking under the stress of a startling event-a beating or
threat of violence by the defendant-the court found the evidence
inadmissible. Relying on State v. Newman,""9 a pre-rules case, the
court held that excited utterances are admissible only if they are a
part of the res gestae of the crime charged.24 0 However, Rule
803(2) does not require that the excited utterance arise out of the
crime at issue-it requires only "an event which causes excite-
ment" and that the declarant speak under the stress of excite-
ment." " Further, the statements in Newman were found not to be
excited utterances because they were made twelve to thirteen
hours after the alleged beating.2 2 Brubaker's application of New-
man unduly limits the scope of the exception provided in Rule
803(2).
Brubaker indicates that in criminal cases the court may take
an especially hard look at hearsay evidence.2 4 ' An extensive foun-
dation should be laid in the presence of the jury for admission of
statements made for purposes of diagnosis or treatment. Under
Rule 804(b)(5), counsel should be prepared to discuss the trustwor-
thiness of both the witness and the declarant. Further, if the court
retains its restrictive approach to the admission of excited utter-
ances, the state will be hard-pressed to make a sufficient showing
to justify their admission.
238. Brubaker, __ Mont. -, 602 P.2d at 980.
239. 162 Mont. 450, 513 P.2d 258 (1973).
240. Brubaker, __ Mont. -, 602 P.2d at 980.
241. See Commission Comment to Rule 803(2).
242. Newman, 162 Mont. at 457, 513 P.2d at 262.
243. Cf. WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 1 803(24)[01], at 803-292 (1979), which states:
In interpreting Rule 803(24), it should also be remembered that need and reliabil-
ity may vary with the type of case being tried. The same courts, which are rather
free in admitting hearsay in non-jury cases, are often reluctant to admit hearsay
against criminal defendants, in part because of constitutional pressures.
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